

Anticorruption and adaptation

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
Implemented by:



Government
Transparency
Institute




Evolution of transparency, corruption, and democracy scores among post-communist European states (2008-2019)




The Romanian Paradox

Single bidder contracts in Romanian public procurement, as share of total contracts




The Romanian Paradox

Mean and median number of competitors in Romanian public procurement (2007-2020)




Adaptation to anticorruption policies

Convictions by accusation per year as percentage of total



Number of DNA indictments per year



What works?

- EU oversight
 - 2/3 mayors convicted for corruption involving national funds are local opposition
 - Such bias related to EU funding is not significant

	<i>County incumbency</i>	<i>County opposition</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>EU funds</i>	19	29	48
<i>Other funds**</i>	24	48	72
<i>Total</i>	43	77	120

What works?

- Local power turnover
 - Government incumbency not significant but county incumbency is
 - Networks more consolidated in counties where the same party is in power a long time