The SELDI initiative was re-launched in November 2012 with the support of DG NEAR’s Civil Society Facility, and currently has 39 members.
The objectives of the new SELDI initiative are carefully thought out to address the critical anticorruption policy and implementation gaps and priorities in the Western Balkans and Turkey identified in the European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy. The project’s monitoring and advocacy activities aim to inform and support the recalibration process of the Enlargement Package to increase its credibility, conditionality, and improve the attractiveness of the EU in the enlargement countries. SELDI also aids EC’s commitment to the principle of “fundamentals first” and to a “stronger role for civil society”.
SELDI utilises three main research tools:
- The Corruption Monitoring System (CMS), which combines significant research and powerful advocacy potential. CMS diagnostics have been applied in Bulgaria since 1998, in Southeast Europe in 2001, 2002, 2014, 2016 and 2019, and occasionally in Georgia and Moldova (before 2009).
- the Monitoring Anti-Corruption Policies Implementation (MACPI) – an innovative instrument for mapping and assessing the anticorruption policies implemented in public organisations. It ascertains whether the corruption vulnerabilities of a public organisation are adequately addressed by anticorruption policies and how effective these policies are. The structural and theoretical aspect of MACPI as well as the findings of its pilot testing are examined in the core publication Monitoring Anti-Corruption in Europe. Bridging Policy Evaluation and Corruption Measurement, whereas CSD Policy Brief No. 52: Refocusing Anticorruption: New Policy Evaluation Tool summarises the key features and uses of this innovative tool.
- The State Capture Assessment Diagnostics (SCAD) – the most recent tool developed by CSD, which has been piloted in the Western Balkans in 2019. The SCAD methodology: a) Verifies the existence of state capture practices in given economic sectors and specific regulatory/enforcement institutions; and b) Considers policy adjustments which close the opportunities for special interests to use the institutions of public governance for private ends.